

## THE POWER OF GONO-GINI IN THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL DYNASTY: Family Party Power in 2020 Simultaneous Regional Elections

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**Abstract:** 29 out of 57 women running in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections are the wives of former regional heads. Thus, in the fourth episode of the simultaneous regional elections, the same issues as the previous simultaneous regional elections reemerge, namely the pragmatism of political parties in recruitment, ultimately fostering political dynasties at the local level. The political dynasty model, which positions the wife as the regional head, has developed in several regions with the same pattern, where all the wives are of regional heads who have served for two consecutive terms. This governance practice is likened to joint power between husband and wife, passed down from generation to generation as a family or private institution. This phenomenological type of qualitative research aims to understand the primary purpose of nominating wives in the regional head elections after their husband's term ends and the routes through which wives become candidates for the regional head, thus forming political dynasties. The results of this academic research show that in the process of deliberately creating a political dynasty, in the third stage, the wife is promoted to the candidacy of the regional head with the main aim of maintaining power and wealth. Novelty: the strength of masculinity in government means that wives are exploited to preserve power and wealth in the formation of political dynasties.

**Keywords:** Gono-Gini Power, Simultaneous Regional Elections, Political Dynasties

**Abstrak:** Dari 57 perempuan yang mencalonkan diri pada Pilkada Serentak 2020, terdapat 29 orang yang merupakan istri kepala daerah sebelumnya. Dengan demikian, pada Pilkada Serentak episode keempat, permasalahan yang sama seperti Pilkada Serentak sebelumnya, yaitu pragmatisme partai politik dalam rekrutmen, pada akhirnya menumbuhkan dinasti politik di tingkat lokal. Model

dinasti politik yang menjadikan istri sebagai kepala daerah berkembang di beberapa daerah dengan pola yang sama yaitu semuanya adalah istri dimana suami merupakan kepala daerah yang menjabat selama dua periode berturut-turut. Praktek penyelenggaraan pemerintahan diibaratkan kekuasaan bersama antara suami dan istri yang diwariskan secara turun-temurun seolah-olah merupakan lembaga keluarga atau lembaga swasta. Penelitian kualitatif bertipe fenomenologi ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apa tujuan utama pencalonan istri dalam pemilihan kepala daerah setelah masa jabatan suaminya selesai? dan melalui jalur apa istri menjadi calon kepala daerah sehingga terbentuk dinasti politik? Hasil penelitian akademis ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam proses pembentukan dinasti politik secara sengaja, pada tahap ketiga, istri diusung menjadi calon kepala daerah, dengan tujuan utama mempertahankan kekuasaan dan kekayaan. Kebaruan: kuatnya maskulinitas dalam pemerintahan berarti istri dieksploitasi untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan dan kekayaan dalam pembentukan dinasti politik.

**Kata kunci:** Kekuasaan Gono-Gini, Pilkada Serentak, Dinasti Politik

## Introduction

One of the goals of reform and regional autonomy is democratization in regional government administration, which contains participatory and independent elements.

<sup>1</sup>Before democracy and regional autonomy, power and development results were enjoyed only by a few elites close to power. Democratization and regional autonomy seek to correct this so that the people, as holders of sovereignty, must be prioritized to enjoy development results. <sup>2</sup>However, post-reform democracy has not experienced changes for the better.<sup>3</sup> The substance is the same as the authoritarian era in the past, namely the emergence of local political

dynasties.<sup>4</sup>In this era of regional autonomy, local rulers who tried to maintain what they had for their children and grandchildren emerged. This differed from President Soeharto's authoritarian era, when he concentrated his political and economic power only in his family circle.<sup>5</sup>

The Regional Head Election (Pilkada), which has been held every five years since 2005, is expected to produce regional heads who are elected through a democratic process so that local leaders can emerge based on democracy and meritocracy. However, the fact is that each regional election only produces regional heads from the previous ruling family, even though they are made through a general election mechanism. Signs

<sup>1</sup> Fitriyah Fitriyah, 'Partai Politik, Rekrutmen Politik Dan Pembentukan Dinasti Politik Pada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada)', *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 11.1 (2020), 1–17.

<sup>2</sup> Djoni Gunanto, 'Tinjauan Kritis Politik Dinasti Di Indonesia', *Sawala : Jurnal Administrasi Negara*, 8.2 (2020), 177–91.

<sup>3</sup> Gani, Iskandar A., et al. "The Constitutional Court's Protection and Fulfilment of the Citizens' Rights: Constitutional and Islamic Law Perspectives." *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga dan Hukum Islam* 8.1 (2024): 317–338.

<sup>4</sup> Mhd. Alfahjri Sukri, 'Dinasti Politik Di Banten : Familisme , Strategi Politik Dan Rendahnya Partisipasi Politik Masyarakat', *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 10.2 (2020), 169–90.

<sup>5</sup> Prihantoro, Hijrian Angga, Noorhaidi Hasan, and Mohammad Yunus Masrukhin. "Islamic Law and The Politics of Nation-State: Debating Citizenship Fiqh Through The Al-Maskut'Anhu Discourse." *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 23.2 (2023).

like this have appeared since the beginning of the implementation of the regional autonomy policy<sup>6</sup>. Hoffman warned of the existence of the phenomenon of petty kings, which is characterized by the emergence of regional ruling elites.<sup>7</sup>

From a theoretical point of view, general elections are the most important means and instrument of democracy.<sup>8</sup> However, the realization of democracy will be felt realistically when the election process is held to determine leadership candidates worthy of the reins of power.<sup>9</sup>

Given Huntington, Elections not only enable democracy to be operational at the grassroots, namely allowing people to choose according to their political preferences, but also allow a country's government to run legitimately, even though the official contribution of elections in upholding democracy is still limited to the procedural area.<sup>10</sup> One condition for fulfilling procedural-minimal democracy is that political positions are held through honest and fair elections and a peaceful power rotation through freedom and fair public

concentration.<sup>11</sup>, substantial involvement of every individual in exercising power, and adequate guarantees of social and economic rights for the people. This view aligns with what Hold conceptualized as democratic autonomy.<sup>12</sup>

We appreciate the development of democracy through direct regional elections, but we must avoid the trap of democratic formalities.<sup>13</sup> Because the formality of democracy will not only threaten the continuity of democracy in Indonesia,<sup>14</sup> But also creates a political regime that works solely to serve power, not to serve society, which is the source of true sovereignty.<sup>15</sup> This is often called Pilkada, which produces a pseudo-democracy full of formalities and fails to produce power that serves the people's interests.<sup>16</sup>

Simultaneous elections are systems that are held simultaneously in several regions. This type of election includes regional heads and

<sup>6</sup> Wimmy Haliim And Andy Ilman Hakim, 'Dinasti Politik: Basis Politik Dan Kepuasan Publik', *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 8.2 (2020), 258.

<sup>7</sup> Asman, Asman. "The Red Yarn of Contemporary Islamic Law Reform: A Critical Study of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im's Thought." *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum dan Pemikiran* 21.1 (2021): 17-44.

<sup>8</sup> Marzuki, Ismail. "Diskursus Khilafah dalam Kajian Fiqh Siyasah Klasik dan Kontemporer." *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam* 15.2 (2021): 325-344.

<sup>9</sup> Ningtyas Septiani Putri, Helmi Hidayat, And R. Cecep Romli, 'Isu Dinasti Politik Pada Pilkada Serentak 2020 Di Media Daring: Analisis Isi Pemberitaan Kompas.Com', *Jurnal Studi Jurnalistik*, 3.2 (2021), 98-112.

<sup>10</sup> Dairani Dairani, 'Upaya Konstitusional Dalam Memutus Mata Rantai Dinasti Politik Pada Pemilukada Serentak Tahun 2024', *Hukmy : Jurnal Hukum*, 2.2 (2022), 199-210.

<sup>11</sup> Sofian, Muhamad. "Penegakan Hukum HAM Ditinjau dari Perspektif Hukum Maqashid Syariah." *Juris Humanity: Jurnal Riset dan Kajian Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia* 2.1 (2023): 29-46.

<sup>12</sup> Yunita Ratna Sari, 'Dinasti Politik Pada Pilkada 2020 Di Jawa Timur Dari Perspektif Rational Choice', *Madani Jurnal Politik Dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan*, 14.1 (2022), 33-53.

<sup>13</sup> Ridla, M. Rasjid. "Sosiologi Hukum Islam (Analisis Terhadap Pemikiran M. Atho'Mudzhar)." *Al-Ihkam: Jurnal Hukum & Pranata Sosial* 1.2 (2006): 133-144.

<sup>14</sup> Heriyanto Heriyanto, 'Dinasti Politik Pada Pilkada Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Demokrasi', *Journal Of Government And Politics (Jgop)*, 4.1 (2022), 29.

<sup>15</sup> Muttaqin, Zainal. "Formalization of Islamic Law in Indonesia in the Framework of Social Engineering Theory by Roscoe Pound." *El-Mashlahah* 11.2 (2021): 97-115.

<sup>16</sup> Johan Pardamean Simanjuntak And Others, 'Analisis Perspektif Mahasiswa Pmm (Pertukaran Mahasiswa Merdeka) Terhadap Dinasti Politik Dalam Pemilu 2024 Di Universitas Negeri Medan', *Ijedr: Indonesian Journal Of Education And Development Research*, 2.1 (2024), 160-65.

DPRD members at various levels, from provincial districts to cities.

The research results of the Nagara Institute, 2020 show that the democratic formalities practiced in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Elections have given birth to political dynasties.<sup>17</sup> Are 124 candidates affiliated with political dynasties, almost evenly distributed in 270 electoral districts at the provincial, district, and city levels? Most of the candidates affiliated with political dynasties are shaped by a misguided basic conception of family principles between professional legitimacy and their social<sup>18</sup>.

Based on several previous studies, the state-of-the-art of this research is from the husband's perspective as a local strongman who exploits his wife to establish a political dynasty and oligarchy.<sup>19</sup> He wanted to maintain his power rather than have his wife participate politically in the race for the regional head.<sup>20</sup> According to him, power is a source of wealth, so it is worthy of being inherited like a commonwealth so that it can be passed down and maintained sustainably.<sup>21</sup>

## METHOD

This research employs a qualitative phenomenological approach with a descriptive method. This approach was chosen because it aims to understand and explain the phenomenon of political dynasties at the local level.<sup>22</sup> Particularly regarding the candidacy of wives for regional head positions after their husbands' terms have ended.<sup>23</sup> This study utilizes secondary data from various literature sources, including academic journals, research reports from relevant independent institutions, news articles, opinions, and analyses from multiple online media, as well as interviews and discussions with individuals closely connected to or directly involved with local political figures.

Data collection techniques in this study include a literature review and an examination of relevant literature such as academic journals, books, research reports, and articles from online media. Additionally, in-depth interviews are conducted with key actors who are involved or have information related to the phenomenon being studied, as well as collecting and analyzing official documents such as government reports, election results, and relevant legislation.

The collected data are analyzed descriptively through steps of data reduction, which involves selecting relevant data from various sources, data display, which presents the data in a structured narrative form to facilitate understanding, and drawing conclusions and verifying findings by comparing multiple data sources. To ensure

<sup>17</sup> Retno Mawarini Sukmariningsih And Ceprudin Ceprudin, 'Batasan Dinasti Politik Perspektif Moral Hukum', *Hukum Dan Dinamika Masyarakat*, 21.2 (2023), 1.

<sup>18</sup> Agus Riyanto, Yulita Nilam Fridiyanti, And Joko Juli Prihatmoko, 'Praktek Dinasti Politik Pada Pilkada Serentak Jawa Tengah Tahun 2020', *Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 10.1 (2024), 35-46.

<sup>19</sup> Hatta Abdi Muhammad And Dony Anggara, 'Dinasti Politik Pada Pemilihan Bupati Kabupaten Batanghari 2020: Analisis Perilaku Pemilih', *Jispo Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 11.1 (2021), 111-32.

<sup>20</sup> Yani, Ahmad, and Megawati Barthos. "Transforming Islamic Law in Indonesia from a Legal Political Perspective." *Al-Ahkam* 30.2 (2020): 159-178.

<sup>21</sup> Swastiani Dunggio And Iskandar N. Yantu, 'Studi Kasus Partisipasi Politik Masyarakat Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Kabupaten Bone Bolango Di Tengah Pandemi Covid 19', *Publik: Jurnal Manajemen Sumber Daya*

*Manusia, Administrasi Dan Pelayanan Publik*, 8.2 (2021), 156-69.

<sup>22</sup> Choiri, Muttaqin, and Farid Ardyansyah. "The Politics of Waqf Practice in Pesantren Kyai Families in Bangkalan Madura." *El-Usrah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga* 7.1 (2024).

<sup>23</sup> Zubaidi, Saifuddin. "Cigarette fatwas, contestation of religious authority and politics in Indonesia." *Ijtihad: Jurnal Wacana Hukum Islam dan Kemanusiaan* 20.1 (2020): 61-78.

the validity and reliability of the research, data triangulation is performed by comparing information obtained from various sources and methods, along with rechecking interview results and documentation to ensure data consistency. This research adheres to ethical research principles, including obtaining consent from informants before conducting interviews, maintaining the confidentiality of informants' personal information, and using data responsibly.

The research focuses on two main questions: what is the primary purpose of nominating wives for regional head elections after their husbands' terms have ended, and through what pathways do wives become candidates for regional head positions, thus forming political dynasties? This research method is expected to gain a deep understanding of political dynasties at the local level, particularly regarding the candidacy of wives as regional heads after their husbands' terms have concluded.

## DISCUSSION

### 1. *Gono-Gini's wealth and power*

Generally, gono gini is joint property acquired, purchased, and built by a husband and wife during the marriage bond. From this meaning, gono-gini is included in the private realm. One form of gono-gini is wealth, which is congruent with one of the power sources: wealth. According to various sources, power is wealth, position/position, and trust. All that is attached to a regional head in this research is a regent, especially one who has led for two periods of approximately ten years.

With this simple understanding, power sources become viable. They must even be maintained and regenerated by his wife and children, like an inheritance that can be divided from generation to generation. The power that is hereditary and only distributed

in a small circle gives them deep-rooted power and tends to be uncontrolled. Dynasty means the continuation of government power held by one line of descent.

This phenomenon can be seen in Haryanti, who inherited the work program of Sutrisno, her husband, who has been Regent of Kediri for two terms. The existence of the dynasty that Sutrisno built survived because of its ability to use the patronage network that Sutrisno and her husband had built. Ana Sophianah is supported by her husband's political oligarch network, Yance. Ana and Haryanti were strengthened and benefited politically to advance in the regional elections by the trust and bureaucratic network down to the lowest level built by Sutrisno and Yance previously and financial capital from their husbands.<sup>24</sup>

While Haryanti and Ana run their government, it is challenging to avoid rent-seeking politics, a variant of her husband's oligarchic network. This is possible because of the strong dominance of husbands; there is still husbands' intervention in making policies, which results in them needing to be more independent in creating policies and managing government management in their area.

Several assets, extensive networks, and strong influence have been accumulated from the results of his work during the two periods of leadership. With this social and financial power, he inherited it as wealth and then accumulated its use to advance his wife in the local political arena. In this case, the wife benefits. My husband didn't stay silent, of course. The husband acts as a mentor, directing the various policies taken in the leadership of his wife's government. In the two examples referred to, Ana and

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<sup>24</sup> Syauket, Amalia, 'Peran Relawan Politik Dalam Konstelasi Politik Indonesia', *Jurnal Hukum Sasana*, 8.1 (2022), 47–56.

Haryanti have been exploited by their husbands' oligarchs to defend their power, which is correlated with the defense of their wealth. in subtle terms such as continuing their work program, inheriting their leadership, and so on. Furthermore, Mills 1956 in Rochadi 2005 said that even the decisions taken for them were indirectly directed at maintaining their domination of power rather than improving the welfare of the people.

**2. 2020 simultaneous regional elections: the ruling family party traps democratic formalities**

It could be said that the most dramatic event for the Indonesian nation at the end of the 20th century was the movement towards democratization. Indonesia is experiencing changes and transitions in its democratization process. It is marked by political openness that has taken place since 1998 with essential achievements, including the growth of civil society, freedom of the press, and demands for government accountability. Since the Direct Pilkada was held in 2005, until the simultaneous (Direct) Pilkada in 2015, local democratization experienced significant dynamics. Direct regional elections and simultaneous regional elections are significant political breakthroughs in realizing democratization at the local level.

Before 2005, regional heads and deputy regional heads were elected by the DPRD. Since the enactment of Republic of Indonesia Law number 32 of 2004 concerning regional government, regional heads have been elected directly by the people through the election of regional heads and deputy regional heads/Pilkada. The first regional elections were held in June 2005 in Kutai Kertanegara Regency, East Kalimantan. Implementing the first phase of regional polls was carried out separately but separately from one region to another. It was

only in 2015 that a synchronization effort was made. Four regional elections were held simultaneously, namely in 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2020, according to Maribeth and Priyambudi, 2009. In 2005, Indonesia had the first experience of directly electing a national leader, and this was the initial momentum for democracy in Indonesia.

Unfortunately, until the 2020 simultaneous regional elections, the political dynamics revealed a blurry picture, namely the emergence of political dynasties which, according to various sources, were called "the 2020 simultaneous regional elections were full of political dynasties," and Koran Tempo even featured the cover story "Family party in power" in the July 20, 2020, edition, with details as follows shown in table-1 below,

**Table-1**

Distribution of Candidates Affiliated with Political Dynasties in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Elections

Candidate for Governor	Candidate for Regent	Candidate for Mayor
Five candidates for governor and four candidates for deputy governor	57 Regent candidates and 30 Deputy Regent candidates	20 mayoral candidates and eight deputy mayoral candidates

Source: Nagara Institute, 2020. Accessed 8 July 2021 by the Author. Why not? The results of the Nagara Institute's findings have shown that as many as 124 candidates are affiliated with political dynasties and are running as regional heads in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections. Of this number, if classified by gender, it will appear as shown in the table below.

**Table-2**

Candidates affiliated with political dynasties based on gender in the 2020 Simultaneous regional elections.



Amount	Description
67=89.3% male candidates	As many as 89.3% of the men who contested were part of political dynasties as sons or brothers of previous regional heads.
57=10.7% female candidates	29 of the 57 female candidates were the wives of previous regional heads.

Source: Nagara Institute, 2020. Accessed 8 July 2021 by the Author.

From the two tables above, the democratic formalities practiced in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections have given birth to political dynasties. This phenomenon also shows that the development of democracy through simultaneous regional elections, on the one hand, should be appreciated. Still, on the other hand, it indicates breakthroughs in democratic formalities. The formality of democracy is not only a threat to the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia but also creates a political regime that works solely to serve power, not to serve the people who are the source of true sovereignty. This is often referred to as regional elections, which produce pseudo-democracy, full of formalities, and fail to produce power that serves the people's interests.<sup>25</sup>

The table above also shows that the recruitment function of political parties still needs to reach expectations. Because political parties have again failed to become laboratories that prepare regional leadership candidates based on great

<sup>25</sup> Mudiayati Rahmatunnisa, 'Menyoal Politik Kekerabatan Di Indonesia Dalam Pelaksanaan Pilkada Serentak 2020', *Jurnal Academia Praja*, 4.2 (2021), 295–316.

democratic values<sup>26</sup>. The pragmatism of political parties is still demonstrated by recruiting people who are not party cadres and have significant capital or are simply populists without government managerial skills. This weak recruitment function gave rise to political dynasties, which are still a problem in democratization at the local level.<sup>27</sup>

Pseudo-democracy is a model of democratic formality, where all democratic processes that are carried out procedurally can run well, but they contain dangers. It contains at least five dangers of democratic formality, including:

1. The phenomenon of strong people, for example, has become a regular and common phenomenon in regional elections, where the regional elections are controlled and dominated by big investors. This is what causes our democracy to have high costs. Strong people even control political parties. Political parties are only used as vehicles for strong people to seize power. The portrait in several regions is that so many incumbents are always elected in regional elections, even though their achievements, innovations, and success stories in managing government are minimal.

<sup>26</sup> Hauyyine Sucipto, Sergio Sitinjak, And Ikhsan Sujatmoko, 'Analisis Dinasti Politik Di Indonesia: Dilema Etika Demokrasi Dan Relevansinya Dalam Keadilan Politik Indonesia', *Kultura: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, Sosial, Dan Humaniora*, 1.3 (2023), 83–90.

<sup>27</sup> Shofiatul, Jannah, and Dwi Hidayatul Firdaus. "Reformulation of the Concept of Iddah in The Compilation of Islamic Law Perspective of Negotiative Hermeneutics." *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum dan Syar'iah* 15.2 (2023): 286-300.

2. Pilkada is still seen as a democratic party marked by high mobility through political promises and the distribution of necessities, clothes, and money. Thus, simultaneous regional elections have not yet been fully used as an arena for deepening democracy. (Maribeth and Priyambudi, 2009)

3. Regional election arrangements provide a mechanism for a single candidate, but this mechanism is complicated to fulfill. Because the main door to nomination is through political parties, and to get party recommendations and sacred letters, only strong people can access them.

4. Regional elections are an arena for democratic pluralism. However, the emergence of strong people and single candidates reflects that democratic pluralism is only a formality. Strong people still control the democratic arena.

5. Regional elections give the people an understanding that they are the ones who have sovereignty. However, people's sovereignty is often manipulated and exchanged for sweet promises from only seasonal politicians. As shown above, the conditions were identified by Liddle, 2007 as a form of "pretended democracy." Aspinall 2005 calls it a "Quasi Democracy," while other researchers, Robinson & Hadiz, 2004 term it a "predatory Democracy" or a democracy controlled by predatory politicians who, according to Tones, 2001 referred to a Pseudo Democracy or pseudo-democracy.

Previous research from Purwaningsih (2015) adds that there are several notes regarding the phenomenon of kinship politics, namely, first, there is a strong enough desire from the incumbent to

maintain power by forming a political family at the local level. Second, significant parties in representative institutions support The tendency to form kinship politics, which means they also receive support from political elites. The support of major parties for candidates from incumbent families who do not even come from party cadres shows the weakness of political parties as instruments of democracy, which rely more on aspects of the candidate's popularity.

Previous research from Amalia Syauket (2021) states that this trap of democratic formality causes us to be too busy with the euphoria of regional elections as a party and less concerned with deliberative democracy, which is its essence. In the end, regional elections always become a party of power, a party of strong people who try to gain legitimacy through formal legal means but fail to strengthen sovereignty, making the people the center of democratic education.

### **3. Route of Formation of Political Dynasties**

Dynastic politics is not new in Indonesia because it is a legacy of traditional power that has existed for centuries. AA Dwipayana (2003) said that the trend of kinship politics is a symptom of neopatrimonialism that has long roots in Indonesian history.<sup>28</sup> The historical root is the patrimonial system, which prioritizes political regeneration based on genealogical ties rather than the merit

<sup>28</sup> Sodiqin, Ali, and Anwar M. Radiamoda. "The Dynamics of Islamic Constitution: From the Khilafah Period to the Nation-State." *J. Islamic L.* 2 (2021): 138.



system in weighing achievements. Genealogical ties have been used as a basis for political regeneration to perpetuate power. According to AA Dwipayana (2003), the spirit of dynastic political practices still circulates in contemporary Indonesian democracy.

Traces of political dynasties in the government system are recorded in Yupa or inscriptions carved on stone monuments about the Kingdom of Kutai in Kalimantan in the 5th century AD. Aswawarman gave the first inheritance of the royal throne to his son, Mulawarman. In historical records, this is the earliest written evidence of political dynasties in Indonesia in the past Kompas 2020 accessed 4 July 2023 The neutral definition of a political dynasty is a series of human political strategies aimed at gaining power so that power remains with them by passing on power or giving some of the power they already have to other people who have it—family relationships with previous power holders. In a political institution, those with close ties to the family often have the privilege of occupying various vital positions in the organization's institutional hierarchy.

From various literature, it can be concluded that what is meant by a strong person is someone, both personally and communally, who has power, authority, influence, voice, control, and access. (access) to influence other people to follow their wishes. Strong people are supported by various kinds of resources, such as social, financial, cultural, traditional, intellectual, and structural

capital.<sup>29</sup> Previous research by Pahlavi, 2021 shows three typologies of strong people in regional elections. First, traditional/cultural is a group of influential people who support candidate pairs based on ethnicity, capital owners, and local rich people who influence the midst of conventional society. Second, intellectuals/spirituals are strong people influenced by their scientific or religious knowledge. Third, structural/material is a typology of strong people who influence because of the position attached to them and the existence of financial capital to support the victory of candidate pairs in political contestations.<sup>30</sup>

From the three typologies above, in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections, there will be efforts to transform local strongmen in building dynastic politics. Consolidation of strong people locally or in language Joel S Migdal, 1998 called a Local Strongman in the clientelism system, which reflects the exchange of power with economic resources.


The route of local strongmen in building a political dynasty is as depicted in the figure below:

**Figure 1**

The Local Strongman's Route in building a political dynasty

<sup>29</sup> Hagi Hutomo Mukti And Rodiyah Rodiyah, 'Dynasty Politics In Indonesia: Tradition Or Democracy?', *Journal Of Law And Legal Reform*, 1.3 (2020), 531–38.

<sup>30</sup> Yoes C Kenawas, 'The Irony Of Indonesia's Democracy: The Rise Of Dynastic Politics In The Post-Suharto Era', *Asian Journal Of Comparative Politics*, 8.3 (2023), 748–64.



Source: Processed from various sources by researchers.

**Table-3**

The route of local strongmen in the formation of political dynasties

Route	1. local strong man	2. local bossis m	3. Politic al dynast y	4. Strength ening the oligarch y
Characte ristics 2	1. contest in the region al electio ns 2. Win the region al electio ns	1. Becom e the incum bent in the follow ing region al electio n 2. mainta in power	1. Encou rage your wife to run for region al electio ns	1. buy political party policies 2. control political parties 3. Strengthe n political cartels

Source: Processed from various sources by researchers.

Figure 1 and Table 3 above show that in the third route, a political dynasty began to be built by encouraging his wife to run for regional elections using the assets her husband had acquired during the two regional election periods. The actual example is Ana Sophanah as regent of Indramayu, who continues the leadership of her husband Rianto MS Syafiuddin, often called Yance Regent of Indramayu for the period 2000-2005 and 2005-2010, and Haryanti as regent of Kediri for the period 2009-2015 and 2016-2021 continuing the figure of Sutrisno, Regent of Kediri for the 1999 period. - 2009. Sutrisno, in this case, as the husband of Haryanti and Yance, Ana's husband, uses the influence of his character as a reflection of invisible power to win his wife as Regent of Indramayu, Regent of Kediri by mobilizing formal figures such as bureaucracy and informal figures to win and gather support from religious and traditional statistics. The role of spiritual and traditional leaders is significant in gaining votes due to socio-community stratification. Kinship in this context refers to the fact that female politicians are related to male politicians, in this case, their very influential husbands. They also facilitated his emergence and victory in the direct regional elections. Continuing the baton of leadership from the male patron to his wife through the procedural mechanism of direct regional elections is an effort to build a political dynasty and perpetuate power at the local level. Why is that? Because their male husbands had previously served as regional heads for two consecutive terms.

Then, to go to the fourth route, husbands do not just let go of running the

government. The husband controls his wife's government by holding several strategic positions behind the scenes. For example, Sutrisno was appointed by Haryanti as Chair of the TPPD (Regional Revenue Technical Implementation Unit) of Kediri Regency. This position made it easier for Sutrisno to build a political cartel, maintain officials' loyalty, strengthen mutually beneficial patron-client relationships, and establish relationships with regional legislative officials. These things were aimed at perpetuating power so that all government affairs and power he had built during the two periods of leadership and continued by his wife would run according to his plans.

Different from Yance in going to the fourth route. Yance does not hesitate to use violence against anyone who opposes him. Yance used political authority to the maximum, even accompanied by repressive actions, which became a vital characteristic of the oligarchic network that Yance built in the Indramayu district. On various occasions openly, Yance stated that he had a particular room in the regent's office, which he called the hall to fully control multiple policies and decisions made by his wife's government. Yance also provides direction, advice, and guidance when issuing specific policies.

The Ana-Yance phenomenon in Indramayu and Haryanti-Sutrisno in Kediri shows that the kinship factor is still vital, which, in his terms, 1987 as Family Connections with a man whose husband is an influential local political figure. In this case, The kinship factor is

not ordinary but rather kinship anchored in oligarchic networks at the regional level towards the fourth route above. These family connections allow women to overcome various political obstacles, such as lack of financial capital, skills, experience, networks, and information. On the other hand, this is also a power trap. Both Ana and Haryanti entered the vortex of oligarchic-political dynasties, which made them unable to run their government independently.<sup>31</sup>

Political dynasties in Indonesia are carried out in two ways: by design and by accident. Political dynasties, by design, have been formed for a long time. In terms of relations, the familial network in government is already strong, so relatives who enter government or participate in political contestation are arranged in such a way as to engineer the success of their goals. An example is the political dynasty that Sutrisno founded in Kediri, which was the first and longest dynasty that remained in existence for 20 years in Kediri, as well as the Yance dynasty in Indramayu, which ruled for almost 20 years in a regenerative manner—inherited from husband to wife. A political dynasty by accident occurs in a situation of government succession where a relative suddenly nominates a relative to replace him to maintain informal power over his successor if he wins in a political contest. A good example occurred in Indramayu; for reasons of taking care of her family, Anna resigned as regent at the end of

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<sup>31</sup> Amalia Syauket, 'Peran Relawan Politik Dalam Konstelasi Politik Indonesia', *Jurnal Hukum Sasana*, 8.1 (2022), 47–56.

2018. Anna's deputy, Supendi, became regent. Also, in Kediri Haryanti to Plh. The Regent of Kediri, Dede Sujana, ends his term of office on February 17, 2021.

This research indicates several characteristics of districts/cities where political dynasties persist. First, political dynasties persist in districts/cities that have matured into democracy. In districts/cities that do not yet have democratic maturity, it will be easier for political dynasties to perpetuate their power because of weak control from society. Second, political dynasties last in districts/cities where community participation in development could be higher. Without community participation in development, it will make it easier for political dynasties to control regional government. Third, political dynasties last in districts/cities with low bureaucratic competence. This low level of bureaucratic competence will make it easier for political dynasties to dominate and control the bureaucracy starting from the grassroots level. Fourth, political dynasties thrive in corrupt districts/cities. Apart from that, political dynasties corrupt a district/city. Yance and Haryanti's steps were stopped because they were caught in corruption.

## Conclusion

Please provide here your remarks as a closing statement. It could be a conclusion from your discussion, analysis, and recommendations for further research projects. In this section, you may also acknowledge people and parties whose supports make your research possible.

Based on the results of this academic research, it shows that in the route of forming a political dynasty by design, it is in the third stage that the wife is promoted to

the regional head candidacy, with the main aim of maintaining power and wealth. The wealth and positions achieved during the two periods as the wife inherits regional heads to continue accumulating wealth. The husband will continue to play the role of local strongman and even godfather in his wife's government. This shows that family power still applies in government even though the wife's position is higher because she is a Regent while the husband is an ordinary citizen. Public wealth and positions and trust, which are sources of power, are included in the private sphere, equated to mutual assets that can be inherited from generation to generation. This academic research also found that the strong presence of masculinity in government means that wives are exploited to maintain power and wealth in the formation of political dynasties.

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